金融時(shí)報(bào):股神凱恩斯？

股神凱恩斯？

約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)是現(xiàn)代宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的創(chuàng)始人，他的《通論》等影響世界的著作讓他享有“資本主義的救星”、“戰(zhàn)后繁榮之父”等美稱(chēng)。那么，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)大師凱恩斯是否也是一位“股神級(jí)”的投資家呢？

測(cè)試中可能遇到的詞匯和知識(shí)：

diversification[da?,v??s?f?'ke???n] n.（投資經(jīng)營(yíng)的）分散化，多樣化

impresario|[,impri'sɑrio] n.歌劇，樂(lè)團(tuán)的經(jīng)理人

harem ['hɑ?ri?m]閨房

Sage of Omaha 奧馬哈先知，奧馬哈圣人，即沃倫·巴菲特

affinity [?'f?n?t?] n.親密關(guān)系，類(lèi)同

dabble ['dæb(?)l] v.涉獵；涉足

currency speculation 貨幣投機(jī)，指通過(guò)短期操縱貨幣兌換謀取匯率變化上的利潤(rùn)

insider trading 內(nèi)幕交易

A lesson from the other ‘sage’ of investing (626 words)

By FT UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST Tim Harford

In his famous letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders in 1988, Warren Buffett declared: “When we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favourite holding period is forever.” Compare this statement, apparently from a kindred spirit: “As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes.”

Earlier, in 1984, Buffett had explained his view on diversification by approvingly quoting the theatre impresario Billy Rose: “If you have a harem of 40 women, you never get to know any of them very well.” Here’s that kindred spirit again:

“It is a mistake to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence.”

In each case the second statement is from a man who is as quotable as the Sage of Omaha himself: John Maynard Keynes, writing to a colleague in 1934. The affinity between Buffett and Keynes isn’t a new discovery but a newly published study of Keynes’s investments for King’s College, Cambridge allows us to see whether Keynes took his own advice, and whether the results paid off.

Keynes had dabbled in currency speculation after the first world war, trading on margin and realising both large losses and large gains. But after assuming responsibility for the college’s investments in 1921, Keynes had to take a different approach. He persuaded the college to liberate part of its endowment from its traditional, highly conservative strictures, and it is this “Discretionary Portfolio” which has been tracked by David Chambers and Elroy Dimson of Cambridge’s Judge Business School.

At first, Keynes – who arguably invented the very idea of macroeconomics – relied on his gifts as an economist to time the business cycle, moving in and out of investments as economic trends dictated. It speaks volumes about macroeconomics that even for Keynes, this approach was not a success. By August 1929, the Discretionary Portfolio lagged behind the UK equity market by a cumulative 17.2 per cent. Worse, the stock market collapsed in September and Keynes had failed to see it coming.

Chambers and Dimson then document a change in Keynes’s approach. Instead of trying to anticipate macroeconomic trends, Keynes searched for undervalued stocks, bought substantial holdings and tended to hold on to them. He favoured companies that paid generous dividends and distressed companies that held out the possibility of recovery. This approach paid off handsomely, dragging Keynes’s lifetime track record with the Discretionary Portfolio up to a 16 per cent annual return, well above the 10.4 per cent of the market as a whole.

But Keynes was not just a successful value investor, he was an investment innovator. He appears to have developed the basic principles of value investing independently of Benjamin Graham, the man most closely associated with the approach. And he advanced the idea that equities were a fit investment for the likes of King’s College, at a time when any respectable investor would have stuck to property and bonds.

One note of caution, however: Keynes was very well connected, particularly in the mining sector, where he invested heavily and successfully. Insider trading was also legal in Keynes’s day.

Chambers and Dimson don’t think that the latter is the chief explanation of Keynes’s success. That said, he was so well connected that in 1925 he even received advance notice that the Bank of England’s interest rate was to change. Value investing is a fine idea – but perhaps a little easier to pull off if you are John Maynard Keynes.

請(qǐng)根據(jù)你所讀到的文章內(nèi)容，完成以下自測(cè)題目：

1.Which statement is TRUE in regarding to Keynes’s idea about ‘diversification’?

A. One should better invest in enterprises he knows about.

B. Diversification does not always reduce the risks of investments.

C. Buffett’s ideas are similar to Keynes’s.

D. All of above.

答案(1)

2.Which of the followings is NOT TURE?

A. Keynes can be considered as the Sage of Omaha and the father of macroeconomics.

B. Keynes advanced the change of Bank of England’s interest rate in 1925.

C. Keynes developed basic principles and advanced innovative ideas in investment.

D. Keynes invested heavily and made a fortune in the mining sector.

答案(2)

3.Which statement is NOT TURE according to the article?

A. In Keynes’s era, most investors preferred bonds and property to equities.

B. Discretionary Portfolio was not a successful idea at the start.

C. Keynes experienced huge gains before the Great Depression of 1929.

D. Keynes knew that the Bank of England was about to change its interest rate in 1925.

答案(3)

4.What do we know about the research of Cambridge’s Chambers and Dimson?

A. They think Keynes’s earnings in the mining sector have nothing to do with his fame.

B. They are professors teaching in Cambridge’s Judge Business School.

C. They agree with the changes of approach that Keynes made in Discretionary Portfolio.

D. None of above.

答案(4)

* * *

(1) 答案：D.All of above.

解釋?zhuān)何闹兴玫膭P恩斯的兩段話(huà)，意思為：“正確的投資方法是將相當(dāng)大比例的資金投入到他個(gè)人認(rèn)為自己非常了解而且管理也完全值得信任的企業(yè)上。而投資人如果認(rèn)為，通過(guò)將資金分散投資到大量他幾乎一無(wú)所知并且沒(méi)有任何理由予以特別信任的企業(yè)，就可以據(jù)此限制自己的投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，這種看法是完全錯(cuò)誤的。”

(2) 答案：B.Keynes advanced the change of Bank of England’s interest rate in 1925.

解釋?zhuān)涸氖?ldquo;...he even received advance notice that the Bank of England’s interest rate was to change”，也就是他被告知、而非預(yù)見(jiàn)了利率的改變。

(3) 答案：C.Keynes experienced huge gains before the Great Depression of 1929.

解釋?zhuān)篊錯(cuò)誤。通讀全文可知，凱恩斯的投資實(shí)踐有三個(gè)階段：第一個(gè)階段是一戰(zhàn)（1918）后的貨幣市場(chǎng)投資； 第二階段是1921年說(shuō)服劍橋大學(xué)改變保守的投資策略，這一階段他的投資并不成功，到1929年，他主持的投資組合比英國(guó)股市平均水平落后了17.2%； 第三階段是頗為成功的，他投資股價(jià)被低估的和高分紅的公司，讓他的一生投資業(yè)績(jī)達(dá)到16%的年回報(bào)率，比市場(chǎng)平均的10.4%高出不少。

在閱讀時(shí)，你會(huì)讀到一些年份和百分?jǐn)?shù)字，重要的是搞清它們的時(shí)間先后和高低順序。

(4) 答案：D.None of above.

解釋?zhuān)篋正確。A與最后一段意思相反，而B(niǎo)、C文中均未提及。