讀《FT·金融時(shí)報(bào)》學(xué)英語：特朗普的狠話帶不來“好工作”

美國制造業(yè)就業(yè)低迷的主因是需求疲軟。特朗普無論做什么，都不會(huì)讓制造業(yè)重新變成“好工作”的來源。

Blame foreigners first.This strategy is always the companion of aggrieved nationalism.It can be seen in Donald Trump's ban on immigrants from seven countries.It will be seen in his protectionism.A kernel of truth — terrorism and the direct impact of imports on jobs — bolsters a lie: my actions are enough to keep you safe and restore the prosperity you once knew.
首先責(zé)怪外國人。這種策略總是與憤憤不平的民族主義相伴。從唐納德·特朗普(Donald Trump)禁止7國移民入境便可以看出這一點(diǎn)。他的保護(hù)主義也會(huì)有這一點(diǎn)。一丁點(diǎn)事實(shí)——恐怖主義和進(jìn)口對(duì)就業(yè)產(chǎn)生的直接影響——支撐了一個(gè)謊言：我的行動(dòng)足以保你平安，恢復(fù)你曾經(jīng)習(xí)以為常的繁榮。

At the heart of the US debate on trade policy is the story of jobs in manufacturing.The single most important fact is the steady decline in the share of jobs in manufacturing from about 30 per cent of total employment in the early 1950s to just over 8 per cent at the end of 2016.
美國貿(mào)易政策辯論的核心問題是制造業(yè)就業(yè)。最重要的事實(shí)是，制造業(yè)在總就業(yè)人數(shù)中的占比持續(xù)下滑，從上世紀(jì)50年代初的30%左右，降至2016年底的略高于8%。

The main explanation for the long-term decline in the share of manufacturing employment in the US (and other high-income economies) has been the rise in employment elsewhere.In 1950, employment in manufacturing was 13m, while that in the rest of the economy was 30m.By the end of 2016, it was 12m and 133m, respectively.Thus, all the increase in employment between 1950 and the end of 2016 occurred outside manufacturing.Yet output of US manufacturing was not stagnant.
Between 1950 and 2016, output rose 640 per cent, while employment fell 7 per cent.Even between 1990 and 2016 output rose 63 per cent, while employment fell 31 per cent.(See charts.)
對(duì)于美國（以及其它高收入經(jīng)濟(jì)體）制造業(yè)就業(yè)占比的長期下滑，主要解釋是其他領(lǐng)域就業(yè)增長。1950年，制造業(yè)的就業(yè)人數(shù)為1300萬，而其他經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的就業(yè)人數(shù)為3000萬。到2016年底，兩個(gè)數(shù)字分別為1200萬和1.33億。也就是說，從1950年到2016年底期間增加的就業(yè)都在制造業(yè)以外。不過美國制造業(yè)產(chǎn)出并沒有陷入停滯。從1950年至2016年，產(chǎn)出增長了640%，與此同時(shí)就業(yè)人數(shù)減少了7%。即使在1990年至2016年期間，產(chǎn)出增長了63%，而就業(yè)人數(shù)減少了31%。（見圖表。）

The explanation for the contrast between output and employment is rising productivity.Yet no one is proposing to stop this.Indeed, the problem is rather productivity's recent stagnation: in manufacturing, output per hour rose only 1 per cent between the first quarters of 2012 and 2016.As a result, employment rose a little.Yet this is a bad outcome: the economy needs rising productivity if it is to generate sustained improvement in living standards.
產(chǎn)出和就業(yè)形成如此反差的原因是生產(chǎn)率不斷提高。不過沒人提出要阻止這一趨勢(shì)。的確，現(xiàn)在的問題是生產(chǎn)率在近年陷入了停滯：在制造業(yè)領(lǐng)域，從2012年第一季度至2016年，每小時(shí)產(chǎn)出僅增長了1%。其結(jié)果是就業(yè)略有增長。然而這是一個(gè)不好的結(jié)果：要想讓人們的生活水平持續(xù)改善，經(jīng)濟(jì)需要不斷提高的生產(chǎn)率。

Between 1997 and 2005, the US trade deficit in manufactures increased by 2.6 per cent of gross domestic product.But today it is at much the same level as in 2005, after shrinking during the financial crisis.How much bigger might output of manufacturing be if this increase in the trade deficit had not occurred? Make the plausible assumption that the impact on value added is some two-thirds of the gross value of the goods.Then the value added in manufacturing might be some 1.7 per cent of GDP higher.Suppose that the effect on employment would be proportionate.Employment in manufacturing would be some 2.5m bigger than it now is.This might have prevented half of the job losses in manufacturing since 1997 and raised manufacturing's share in employment to more than 10 per cent.
從1997年至2005年，美國制造業(yè)貿(mào)易逆差的增幅相當(dāng)于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的2.6%。但在金融危機(jī)期間出現(xiàn)縮小后，如今的水平和2005年差不多。如果貿(mào)易逆差沒有增長，現(xiàn)在的制造業(yè)產(chǎn)出可能會(huì)大出多少？讓我們作一個(gè)合理的假設(shè)：對(duì)附加值的影響是對(duì)商品總值影響的三分之二。由此推算，制造業(yè)附加值大于當(dāng)今實(shí)際水平的程度可能相當(dāng)于GDP的1.7%。假設(shè)對(duì)就業(yè)的影響是成比例的。制造業(yè)就業(yè)人數(shù)會(huì)比現(xiàn)在多250萬左右。這可能會(huì)阻止自1997年以來一半的制造業(yè)就業(yè)流失，并且把制造業(yè)就業(yè)在總就業(yè)人數(shù)中的占比提高至10%以上。

In sum, the increase in the trade deficit in the early 2000s had a significantly negative effect on employment in manufacturing, but next to none on the long-term decline in the share of overall employment in manufacturing.Even if the trade balance had remained unchanged in the early 2000s, there would still have been a big reduction in the share of employment in manufacturing from the late 1990s.For that, the main reason was weak demand: not surprisingly, the absolute declines in employment in manufacturing occurred during the two recessions, in the early 2000s and again in 2007-09.
簡(jiǎn)言之，2000年代初的貿(mào)易逆差增長對(duì)制造業(yè)就業(yè)產(chǎn)生了顯著負(fù)面影響，但對(duì)制造業(yè)就業(yè)占總就業(yè)人數(shù)比重的長期下滑幾乎沒有影響。即使2000年代初貿(mào)易平衡保持不變，制造業(yè)就業(yè)在總就業(yè)人數(shù)中的占比仍然會(huì)比上世紀(jì)90年代末大幅降低。對(duì)此，主要原因是需求低迷：并不令人意外的是，制造業(yè)就業(yè)人數(shù)的絕對(duì)數(shù)下滑都出現(xiàn)在兩次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間：2000年代初和2007年-2009年期間。

What part of the rise in the trade deficit was due to the North American Free Trade Agreement and China's accession to the World Trade Organisation? Bradford DeLongof Berkeley concludes that it is quite modest.A more sophisticated analysis by Daron Acemoglu of MIT and others concluded that trade with China directly caused the loss of about 10 per cent of the total number of jobs lost in manufacturing between 1999 and 2011.But analysis of linkages among firms and the impact upon local demand gives far larger negative effects of between 2m and 2.4m jobs, though this is still less than 2 per cent of total employment.
貿(mào)易逆差上升的多大部分應(yīng)該歸因于《北美自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》(NAFTA)或中國加入世界貿(mào)易組織(WTO)呢？伯克利(Berkeley)的布拉德福德·德隆(Bradford DeLong)得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為，這部分相當(dāng)有限。麻省理工學(xué)院(MIT)的達(dá)龍·阿西莫格魯(Daron Acemoglu)等人所做的更復(fù)雜的分析總結(jié)稱，對(duì)華貿(mào)易直接造成1999年至2011年間大約10%的美國制造業(yè)就業(yè)崗位消失。但對(duì)企業(yè)與當(dāng)?shù)匦枨笏苡绊懼g關(guān)聯(lián)進(jìn)行的分析表明，負(fù)面影響遠(yuǎn)大于此，就業(yè)損失在200萬至240萬之間，盡管占總就業(yè)人數(shù)的比重仍然不到2%。

Two big points emerge.The first is that the effect of import competition is often geographically concentrated.This is a particularly big challenge in a country as large as the US.The best response must be a combination of helping affected communities to generate new sources of employment and assisting workers (and not just those directly affected) to gain skills and so new jobs.A part of the strategy must also be tohelp restore lost US mobility.
由此可看出兩大要點(diǎn)。第一個(gè)是，進(jìn)口帶來的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)影響往往集中于某些地理區(qū)域。這對(duì)美國這樣幅員遼闊的國家來說是個(gè)格外重大的挑戰(zhàn)。最佳回應(yīng)只能是這樣一套組合拳：幫助受影響的社區(qū)產(chǎn)生新的就業(yè)來源，同時(shí)幫助工人（而且不僅是那些直接受到影響的工人）掌握技能、從而獲得新工作。該策略還必須包括幫助恢復(fù)美國失去的勞動(dòng)力流動(dòng)性。

The second point is the need to sustain demand and so ensure that new jobs replace the old ones in the economy as a whole.The orthodox view is that the US can always achieve full employment by active use of fiscal and monetary policy tools.Experience since 2000 and especially since the financial crisis suggests this may be difficult.As I have argued elsewhere, huge current account surpluses in some countries forced deficit countries into financial excesses as an (ultimately unsustainable) way to maintain demand in line with potential output.The crisis vindicated the concern of John Maynard Keynes about the potentially malign role of surplus countries in the global economy.
第二點(diǎn)是需要維持需求，以此確保在經(jīng)濟(jì)作為一個(gè)整體中，新就業(yè)能夠替代舊崗位。正統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)是，美國總是可以通過積極地利用財(cái)政和貨幣政策工具來實(shí)現(xiàn)充分就業(yè)。自2000年、特別是金融危機(jī)以來的實(shí)驗(yàn)似乎表明，這可能很難實(shí)現(xiàn)。正如我已經(jīng)在其他文章中論述的那樣，某些國家巨大的經(jīng)常賬戶順差迫使逆差國家過度使用金融工具，作為維持需求與潛在產(chǎn)出相符的（最終不可持續(xù)的）方式。金融危機(jī)證明，約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)對(duì)于順差國家在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中可能起到有害作用的擔(dān)憂是正確的。

Alas, the policies proposed by Mr.Trump and the congressional Republicans — a combination of piecemeal protectionism with a large fiscal stimulus as well as elimination of much of the social safety net — is likely to impose large costs on unprotected sectors, while leaving supporters even more desperate.Nothing he does will reinstate manufacturing to its lost role as the dominant provider of “good jobs”.Cheap imports and the ability to supply them have also brought big benefits to domestic consumers and foreign workers.
可惜，特朗普和共和黨國會(huì)議員提出的政策——零打碎敲的保護(hù)主義，大規(guī)模的財(cái)政刺激，以及消除很大一部分社會(huì)保障——很可能讓不受保護(hù)的領(lǐng)域承擔(dān)巨大成本，同時(shí)讓支持者更加絕望。特朗普無論做什么，都不會(huì)讓制造業(yè)重新變成“好工作”的主要來源。廉價(jià)的進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品以及供應(yīng)它們的能力，也給國內(nèi)消費(fèi)者和外國工人帶來了巨大好處。

The right approach would be proactive, not defensive: it would open global markets; it would force countries with huge surpluses to rely more on domestic and less on external demand; it would help workers and communities hit by adverse change, not abandon them; it would stop blaming foreigners for the “crime” of selling goods cheaply.Such policies would make excellent sense.Alas, they are not what we will see.
正確的政策姿態(tài)應(yīng)該是主動(dòng)積極的，而非守勢(shì)的：它將打開全球市場(chǎng)的大門；它將迫使運(yùn)行巨額順差的國家更多地依靠?jī)?nèi)需、減少對(duì)外需的依賴；它將幫助那些遭受不利變化打擊的工人和社區(qū)，而不是拋棄他們；它將不再責(zé)怪外國人“犯下”銷售廉價(jià)商品的“罪行”。這類政策完全站得住腳?？上覀儾粫?huì)看到這些政策。